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An illustrative construction-firm scenario

A supplier asks to change bank details before Friday

A construction office receives an email that appears to come from a known supplier. It asks for the next progress payment to go to a new account and pressures the team to pay before the weekend. This scenario shows how we combine Microsoft 365 security, payment verification and staff training so a convincing message does not become a payment. It is not a claim about a named client or a recovered amount.

Why the message looks credible

The attacker uses the project relationship, not just a fake logo.

A supplier mailbox may be compromised, a lookalike domain may be registered, or a real conversation may be forwarded with the bank details changed. The message can mention the correct project, invoice and contacts while asking for one exception to the normal process.

The safe response is not to inspect the logo more carefully or reply to the same email. Stop, use the supplier’s known contact route, and require independent verification and approval before changing the instruction.

  • New bank details or payment method
  • Pressure to skip the normal call-back
  • A changed reply-to address or domain
  • A request for secrecy or unusual urgency

Controls that make the request harder to act on

No single filter or employee has to catch every attempt.

LayerWhat we configure or practicePurpose
IdentityMFA, conditional access, least privilege and rapid account disablementMake a stolen password less useful and contain a compromised account
Email authenticationSPF, DKIM and DMARC review, impersonation and lookalike-domain checksMake supplier and internal impersonation more difficult
Mailbox and linksSuspicious forwarding rules, phishing and attachment controls, link review and report handlingCatch many malicious messages before or after delivery
Payment processIndependent call-back on a known number, two-person approval and a written supplier change recordDo not let the emailed request approve itself
Awareness and responseRole-based drills for office, project and finance staff, with clear escalation and bank contactMake a suspicious request easy to stop and report

The safe response

Technology supports the process; it cannot replace it.

1
Pause the changeDo not pay, reply, open more attachments or forward the request to someone else for approval.
2
Call on a known numberUse a number from the contract, an earlier trusted record or an independently verified source—not a number in the suspicious email.
3
Require a second approvalA different designated approver confirms the change and records who verified it, when and through which channel.
4
Report and investigateIT checks the sender, mailbox rules, sign-ins, related messages and whether the supplier or a colleague has been compromised.
5
Practice the processUse payment-change drills to keep the call-back and two-person rule familiar to everyone who can change payment instructions.

If money has already moved, call the bank’s fraud line immediately, then contact us. Do not wait for a training session or a normal discovery call. Read our business email compromise guidance or the phishing-protection client story.

Test the process before a supplier request tests it for you

Review your email, identity and payment-change process with us. We will identify the gaps and give you a practical remediation plan.

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